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Scene One/Warning Signs: Puritanism and the Early American 
Theatres of Cruelty 
Anthony Kubiak 
Television came over on the Mayflower. —Don DeLillo 
1. 
While it has become commonplace, following the work of Perry Miller 
and especially Sacvan Bercovitch, to see the Puritan "project" in terms of a 
progressive iconization of self as saint—the self as constructed hero emerging 
from the Puritan propensity "for epitome," to quote Bercovitch—this casting of 
self as principle player in a theologico-political drama has never been discussed 
specifically in terms of theatre or theatrical ontology. The reasons might seem 
obvious—the Puritans vilified theatre, often for reasons that were oddly prescient; 
the theatre, like the Hollywood film of today, tended to demean women, and to 
focus undue attention on sex and violence. Theatre, moreover, in its reliance on 
the false and the illusory tended to coarsen sensibility, empathy and even 
perception itself.1 In this the Puritan attack on theatre anticipated not only 
conservative Christian ideology of today, but also certain strains of feminism and 
cultural studies, as well. 
I would like to suggest a reassessment of some of these early American 
Puritan texts—most particularly the diaries—through the ontological lens of mise 
en scene not only because these texts enact an uncanny grasp of theatrical 
consciousness, but because that consciousness represents the very re-emergence 
of the theatre that Puritanism had seemingly repressed, a theatre that in following 
ages saw an increasing, and increasingly unacknowledged, theatricalization of 
American culture. 
This "newly discovered" theatricalization of America—which some have 
seen emerging in a modern American society, a society of the image and the 
sound bite, the society of television—was a theatricalization that had its roots in 
the very inception, the very idea of America. From the Puritan concerns with 
self/surveillance, through the Franklinesque focus on the mere appearance of 
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propriety and prosperity, from the culture of the con-man, the spectacles of 
religious revival at Cane Ridge, Tennessee, and the Barnumesque spectacles of 
nineteenth and twentieth-century America, right up to the inevitable discovery of 
television and the appearance of the American president-as-actor, American 
culture has been unknowingly immersed in and formulated through theatre, 
through the ontologies and strategies of seeing and being seen, revelation and 
concealment. 
It is the unknowingness of that immersion that fascinates me—for all of 
the professed hatred of sham and theatricality in American culture, we are 
perhaps more than any other a society of the spectacle. And yet in our demand 
for the authentic, the true, beneath the masks of sham and mere appearance, we 
demonstrate what is, I think, a unique blindness to the nature of 
theatricality—Hindsight1 that I believe finds its nascent expression in Puritan 
writing. 
These texts describe the surveillance phenomenology of theatre in very 
different ways: watching and being watched in the Puritan style of John Winthrop 
and Michael Wigglesworth, of course, but also the awareness of watching oneself 
watch—seeing oneself through the watcher's eye, the making of a seeming self 
through the insubstantiality of the (once) seen—in the writings of Thomas 
Shepard. This was, in Puritan society, a long series of theatrical meditations that 
had no theatre at its conclusion, not unlike the long and tortured meditations of 
another genius whose ruminations realized no theatre, Antonin Artaud. In fact, 
the writings of Artaud, also obsessed with self-surveillance, represent an almost 
absolute inversion of Puritan ontology. 
2. 
Artaud's Second Manifesto for the Theatre of Cruelty is an anti-colonial 
text that presents a scenario, The Conquest of Mexico, which purports to enact, 
from the viewpoint of his theatre of cruelty, the defeat of Mexico (in the person 
of Montezuma) by Spain (in the person of Cortez), and the decimation of 
Mexico's inhabitants. This scenario was chosen, Artaud explains, in order to 
"pose the question of colonization"—most probably the French colonization of 
Algeria, and the attempted colonization of Indochina—and through the issues of 
colonization to foreground the moral and ideological scandal of racism. 
Although he does not raise the issue directly, the scenario as it exists 
seems to suggest, in its violence and its excess, the concomitant issue of what has 
been called endocolonization, a term used by theorists to indicate—in a somewhat 
simplistic rendering—the processes by which not only cultures, but the structures 
of thought that give shape to cultures are themselves colonized by dominant 
ideologies; when dominant cultures take over and marginalize indigenous peoples, 
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for example, they not only restructure culture itself, they restructure the very 
ways that indigenous peoples think. Furthermore, dominant culture perpetuates 
itself by endocolonizing itself, determining not merely what its own subjects think 
and believe, but how they think and how they believe. Thus dominant culture 
controls not only what is acceptable to think, it also controls the possibilities of 
what can be thought. Although, as Gramsci points out, the structuring of 
hegemonic forces is quite a bit messier than I have presented it here—allowing, 
for example, new counter-forces to emerge from within hegemony—the "through-
line" of endocolonization theory is that the endocolonized mind, because its 
thought strategies have been changed, remains blind to its own colonization. 
Endocolonization determines the edges of consciousness, in other words, 
and determines those edges through a theatrical reciprocity—a theatre of mind 
which projects itself as culture, and a theatricalized culture that in turn infects the 
processes of perception. Thought, mind, and culture are thus as much the product 
of theatre as theatre is a "manifestation" of culture. Artaud is thus able to 
theatricalize Cortez's conquest not only because conquest is intrinsically 
theatrical, but also because the endocolonized mind thinks through the display and 
representation of power and dominance. Artaud's scenario, then, shows us 
theatre recuperating colonization, but it also shows us thought colonized by/as 
theatre. 
The kind of power deployment Artaud suggests in this scenario works 
only in the absence of critical (Brechtian) distance—what we would term a theory 
of performance, but a theory that incorporates at its center the ontologie and 
epistemological problem of the theatrical as the condition of consciousness, a 
condition which, in the absence of such a theory, remains concealed to itself. The 
push toward thought—critical thought—that somehow moves through the coarser 
structures of the concealing mind and duplicitous consciousness and toward 
something both terrifying and sublime in Artaud's work, suggests his strong 
desire to identify that which is divine in consciousness and thought itself. Note 
that the issue is to identify, not identify with—Artaud's desire is to be the divine, 
not merely to lay himself subservient to it. There is, nonetheless, a pursuit of 
moral purity in Artaud, emanating from his Gnostic belief in the falleness of 
flesh, that has strong Puritanical echoes. For while Calvinism rejected 
Manichaeism, the rejection was often not convincing. 
Thus while the intersection between Artaud's manifesto and the 
theatricalization of America, or even more problematically, the Puritan mind, 
may seem odd at first glance, the correlations are, I think, productive. The 
Puritans were, of course, both colonizers and colonized. I am suggesting that the 
colonization of America, like Cortez and Artaud's colonization of Mexico, 
appears first as theatre. But while Artaud theatricalizes colonization within a 
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performative cruelty that ironically resists theatricalization in its search for life, 
in America colonization occurs through the efficacy of a life that is both 
increasingly theatricalized and resistant to any attempts to distance or theorize it. 
This stage was set in the most unlikely of places, in the Puritan world of New 
England where theatre itself was anathema—where in fact theatre was repressed, 
was repression itself—and the Puritan diary (among other surveillance techniques) 
took its place.3 
Now, in order for theatre to be "repressed" there must, obviously, be 
some sort of theatre already in place. If, as was the case for the Puritans, there 
was no established theatre, if theatre existed only as a condition or possibility of 
mind, then theatre becomes its own origin and end—the conscious mind, in other 
words, does not find its contours in an externalized structure, in (a) play, but only 
in yet another expression or representation of mind-play. This was certainly the 
case with Artaud, who created virtually no theatre in his life, a situation that 
Michel Foucault cites as the root cause of his madness—a closed theatricalized 
consciousness which finds no escape through mise en scene to the "real" stage. 
In the case of the Puritans, theatre, though absent as an institution, nonetheless 
acts interiorly as a kind of performance feed-back loop which forms the very basis 
of morality—one is constantly assessing and reassessing how one acts to order to 
ascertain if one has acted well. In fact, even one's intentions are objectified as 
exhibition or show through the interior watching, and are moved out of the realm 
of the merely intentional into the realm of the performative (how I present myself 
to myself), and into performance itself: I act, and I act well, but finally I realize 
that acting well reveals nothing about the condition or even the existence of my 
true self. Acting well might in fact be the best cover-up for a self that has denied 
God and his ways. My performance, in other words, finally refers to nothing but 
itself—it, as Augustine charges, turns its back on life. The issue, ultimately, in 
the Puritan mind becomes the ability to construct one's own character, to 
construct oneself as a character, to construct character itself. Here is where the 
issue of the performative gives way, it seems to me, to theatre. For 
performativity, as used, for example, by Judith Butler, denotes the conditions 
under which one becomes or "does" one's body/identity. The process, unlike the 
becoming or doing of theatre, is largely unconscious and concealed, but 
influenced by any number of cultural norms and biases. Theatre, on the other 
hand, seemingly brings into view the processes of enacting itself, and in doing so 
largely ignores or forgets what is already in place—gender identity, for example. 
Theatre becomes a kind of second-rate performativity, a fake performativity, 
while performativity itself becomes the more inclusive term because it exists a 
priori to theatre. But this ignores, among other issues, the problem of precession: 
the theoretical notion of the performative, like the performative itself, is grounded 
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in and emerges from the idea of theatre: it is theatre that in essence "gives birth" 
to the category of the performative, both historically and, as Jacques Derrida has 
pointed out, epistemologically as well. 
Yet this theoretical quibble is no simple invocation to cultural 
constructivist views of theatricalization—that it is theatre and not the performative 
that best describes the coming to being of identity. Butler herself seems to 
challenge such simple notions of constructivism, and indeed, the issue of cultural 
constructivism is itself challenged through the example of the Puritan diary. In 
New Canaan the cultural voices were loud and clear. It was obvious to the 
Puritans what they must be, what they must become, and why. They set about 
consciously to construct that self, and yet lived in constant awareness of their 
failures. If the cultural definitions were so powerful, what are we to make of the 
fact that, try as they might, these diarists could not construct or reconstruct desire 
and will? It is, of course, unknowable if these men were as sinful as they say 
they were, or if they seemed or even acted so. To suggest that they "really" 
didn't want to be good and were just acting merely underscores my point—at one 
level at least the Puritan experience seems to suggest that one cannot change the 
lineaments of will or desire to conform to ideology (indeed, at some level this is 
one of the central issues in the history of Western drama). The failure, finally, 
to construct that life through an unrealized theatrical ontology links Artaud and 
Puritanism—both I would argue, although in very different ways, suffer the 
derangement of theatre activated but unrealized. Both are left bereft by a theatre 
operating only as consciousness. There is a strange affinity in the means to the 
presumed end~the purification of life and thought, "a meticulous and unremitting 
pulverization of every insufficiently fine, insufficiently matured form, " a need to 
restrain the spirit from taking its leap "until it has passed through all the filters 
and foundations of existing matter" then redoubling its labor "at the incandescent 
edges of the future. "4 The words are, of course, Artaud's, but they seem imbued 
with the spirit of Puritanical desire—the desire for a salvation which was intense 
in its focus and purity, but never known for certain. Indeed, Artaud's whole 
notion of a theatre of cruelty stands in strange and even harrowing relation to the 
Puritan ethos—the strict moral "athleticism, " the activation of a theatricality that 
seeks "not theatre but life itself," the powerful emphasis on a life delivered from 
delusion. "This cruelty," says Artaud, referring to theatre itself, "can thus be 
identified with a kind of severe moral purity which is not afraid to pay life the 
price it must be paid."5 Words that might have sprung, albeit with a certain 
moral subterfuge, from the pen of the pious Puritan Michael Wiggles worth 
himself. 
The Puritan "theatre of morals" also moves outside the more strictly 
theoretical ideas of Artaud. The self-observation and self-correction of the 
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Puritans is employed by means of recollected memory and desire and is similar, 
in some respects, to Stanislavskian technique, and through him, to American 
Method acting. A kind of theatricalized narrative is constructed on the basis of 
this recollection which allows the director/moralist to ascertain the status of his 
intentions—were they pure (do not enter the theatre with mud on your feet)? Was 
behavior seemly? Was righteousness observed? Yet at the moment that this 
theatricality emerges, it is repressed as theatre and seemingly reemerges as "life, " 
as the correction of false motive, false consciousness, or sinful desire. Theatre 
thus becomes in Puritanism the repressed origin of life, the means by which one 
is saved or becomes righteous—becomes, in other words, an authentic human 
being—"a child of God." "Theatre is born in its own disappearance," writes 
Derrida, "and the offspring of this movement has a name: man."6 While the 
Puritans sought "man"—their own personal identity and salvation in 
Christ—Artaud sought to erase man entirely, to create a theatre that "sweeps away 
human individuality, and in which man is only a reflection."7 Thus in both 
Artaud and Puritanism, "man," self, identity, is created through the very absence 
of "real" theatre—in Artaud because he cannot realize his theatre of cruelty, and 
in Puritanism because it remains blind and resistant to theatre. Yet in both Artaud 
and Puritanism, it is also the failure to activate this theatre that is the problem, 
whereas later on in American drama it is the failure to activate theatrical theory 
that is the problem. In either case, one is consigned to blindness unless one sees 
the inevitable interplay between a consciousness that is formulated as if, and its 
expression as theatre—a theatre that is inevitably representational, perhaps even 
at some moments irresolutely real as as-if. 
3. 
In the chapter called "The Castaway" in Melville's Moby-Dick? Pip, the 
cabin boy, falls overboard in the heat of the whale hunt. He manages to stay 
afloat, but as the ship disappears over the horizon, and he finds himself bobbing 
in the undifferentiated sea, he goes mad, sees "the multitudinous God-
omnipresent, coral insects, that out of the firmament of waters heaved the colossal 
orbs, " sees "God's foot upon the treadle of the loom, and spoke it. " He expresses 
that ineffable revelation, however, in a most distressing way: 
"This way comes Pip—poor boy! would he had died, or I; he's 
half horrible to me. He too has been watching all these 
interpreters—myself included—and look now, he comes to read, 
with that unearthly idiot face. Stand away again and hear him. 
Hark!" 
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"I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they 
look. " 
"Upon my soul, he's been studying Murray's 
grammar."9 
So also the earliest moments of the American experience as parable: the approach 
of the first band of Puritans led by John Winthrop writing his proclamation, he 
tells us, while they are still out on the Atlantic Ocean, the idea of civilization-as-
theatre formulating itself before civilization even takes root, emerging instead, 
like Pip's madness, on the undifferentiated sea, and finding its expression in the 
invocation to the seeing and being seen, to the interpreting and the seeing of 
interpretation; the proclamation ordains the new land "a city on a hill, " an object 
of wonder, a dramatic melding of set and character, actors strutting against the 
backdrop of the New Canaan before the assembled gaze of the world, "I look, 
you look, he looks. " The proclamation, in fact, bespeaks a man and a community 
already laboring under the watchful gaze of man and God. It is a community 
founded on watching—God watching them, they watching each other, each 
watching herself, and watching herself watch: 
So the ground of love is an apprehension of some resemblance 
in the things loved to that which affects it, this is the cause why 
the Lord loved the Creature, so far as it hath any of his Image 
in it, he loves his elect because they are like himself, he 
beholds them in his beloved son; so a mother loves her child, 
because she thoroughly conceives a resemblance of herself in 
it. Thus it is between the members of Christ, each discerns by 
the work of the spirit his own image and resemblance in 
another.10 
In the mirroring projection of self-identity in otherness, one sees oneself in the 
other, in one's gaze upon the other, and sees in the other's gaze the projection of 
one's own guilt or glory—in the eyes of the other, the eyes I give to the other, I 
perceive my possibility and my failure: 
The eyes of all people are upon us; so that if we shall deal 
falsely with our god in this work we have undertaken and so 
cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be 
made a story and a by-word through the world, we shall open 
the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of god.11 
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Succeeding or failing in the charge that god has given them, in other words, will 
turn their endeavor into a story, a story enacted even now before the eyes of the 
world. Thus the failure or success of the noble experiment is already being sealed 
in a kind of grand play produced in the theatre of humanity. The mechanism of 
the experiment—and the means by which we gauge its success or failure—lay in 
the eye of Puritan watchfulness, playing upon the actions of men. This was "a 
complex mimetic logic," in the words of Frederick Dolan, 
a circular chain in which Winthrop's community mimes God's 
law (as revealed in the Bible), and the world, through miming 
the Puritan community, is brought to God; an endless chain of 
similitude, resemblance, and identification governs the colony's 
theologicopolitical strategy.12 
The similitude and search for resemblances, the captivation by mimesis that so 
distressed Artaud, means also, of course, that one is always alive to difference, 
to otherness as the sign and symptom of one's failure. 
The intense, self-absorbed and ironically ego-enhancing activity of self 
observation is, as has often been observed, part and parcel of the Puritan mindset 
in general. Indeed, in the earliest Puritan America watchfulness of all kinds was 
the key to salvation and even survival, from the "panoptical" Puritan concept of 
the village—central placement of the church, the village surrounding common 
pasture land, the very compactness of the village itself making all who lived 
within it visible to all—to the self-examination and preaching activities of 
ministers, to the public display of sinners, to the use of the diary as a means of 
objectifying a self that could then be measured against Puritan standards of 
behavior. Everett Emerson writes:13 
[The] personal documents reveal much about the nature of 
Puritanism. Self examination by means of a diary had obvious 
virtues. The self that examines and the self examined could be 
distinguished as the diarist objectified his experiences, his 
feelings, his reasonings. What he learned about himself he 
recorded and by externalizing it felt a greater sense of control.14 
The diary, then, helps the author narrativize his life and observations. He creates 
a true fiction, what Jean Genet calls a "false spectacle borne of a true illusion," 
through the form of the diary and uses it to translate his perceptions into "facts" 
that could be scrutinized over and over again. He utilizes, more than anything 
else, his memory of the day's events, and his memory turns those events into 
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something like the fact of memory-identity—the diary thus represents the contents 
of memory, as well as what that memory could not contain. The Puritan diary, 
moreover, takes on historical interest for us—it provides a "glimpse into the 
Puritan mind." And yet the memory that the diary represents also resists 
historicization just as any personal memories resist historicization unless they are 
ratified by others who can verify what memory gives over. Memory demands 
witness, in other words, to move into the domain of the historical. And it is the 
private and personal nature of the diaries that generates this resistance—how do 
we know that what they represent was in any way typical of the "Puritan mind, " 
or even that such a thing as a Puritan mind existed? 
And yet the form of the personal diary also resists the status of "mere" 
memory. In the diaries after all, the observation of other selves (the Puritan 
village cum institution) was shifted to the observation of self by self through the 
eye of the other, thus activating a consciousness that was grounded in mise en 
scene. The form and content of the diary, in other words, is generated through 
the very public (historical) eye of Puritan watchfulness—the spiritual and 
behavioral concerns, the Calvinist doctrine, the ethos of the diary itself, were all 
shared communal experiences, as were, presumably, the experiences being 
recorded. But this decidedly Brechtian-like distancing fails the Puritan 
imagination precisely because—though it is profoundly theatrical—it lacks an 
actual theatre through which the personal vision of one's struggle can be 
assimilated into, or judged against, a communal consciousness. The repressive 
aspects of theatre-as-social-control are here ameliorated when we see theatre's 
lack in the neurotic consciousness of Puritan writing. Even though theatre in 
some sense formulates (rather than "celebrates") communal attitudes and biases, 
it also provides an essential outlet through which those biases can be critiqued 
(leading, of course, to yet another round of formulated biases and attitudes). The 
earliest impulse toward theatrical consciousness in America, and American's deep 
distrust of that very theatricality, find their sources in the earliest days of the 
American experience, where such a formulated community might "rejoice 
together, mourne together, labor and suffer together, always having before our 
eyes our Commission and Community."15 
4. 
For a people who formulated themselves so completely through the 
promiscuity of the other/self's voyeuristic eye, it is perhaps no surprise that 
through the past 400 hundred years this group of colonizers has itself undergone 
so many recolonizations. True to the theatrical ontology of absence which 
haunted them, the Puritans, through rehearsals, revisions and rewrites, have 
seemingly dissolved into an endless precession of dramatic images. For many 
24 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
years the butt of jokes and caricatures both in America and Europe, the Puritans 
early on were often portrayed as stiff, pious busybodies, concerned not only with 
their own salvation, but with the salvation of all those with whom they lived, 
fearing sin in others as much as in themselves because sin in any part of the 
community could bring down God's wrath on the whole of that community—guilt 
and responsibility moving in the realm of the Imaginary. The image of sinners 
set out for public display in stocks, with their sins "writ full large" in signs about 
their necks quickly became stereotypical of the Puritanical rage for guilt and 
punishment through, in part, the representations of sin and guilt. The caricatures 
of Puritanism, in fact, did much to help the literary careers of nineteenth-century 
artists. Most noteworthy perhaps, but not alone in his condemnation of 
Puritanism, was Nathaniel Hawthorne. 
Later, in the middle and latter part of our own century, thanks in large 
part to the work of Perry Miller, the Puritans were recuperated as a more human, 
less fanatical religious group. They drank, they liked sex and good food, they 
laughed and danced and read poetry, all with relative abandon, all seemingly 
without guilt or remorse. They were a people who valued progress and 
prosperity, and linked the prosperity of the individual and community with 
righteousness and proper piety. This, along with their penchant for observation 
and exactitude moved quite easily into the strictures of commerce and the 
empirical sciences. These Puritans were a focused and deliberate people, to be 
sure, but full of vigor and life, appreciative of what life offered them in the 
pleasures with which they surrounded themselves. 
Then, seemingly swimming against this revisionism, there was Michael 
Wigglesworth,16 a dyspeptic, nosy moralizer obsessed with guilt, "a poor, sinful 
worm" undeserving even of God's wrath. Whatever recuperation the Puritans 
might have undergone is undone the minute Wigglesworth's diaries are opened. 
Even his name seems a caricature of Puritanical ridiculousness and absurdity that 
is quickly confirmed as one reads him, and reads about him. 
Wigglesworth was a man without humor, "chief among sinners," with 
seemingly no appreciation for pleasure or any of the forms pleasure might take. 
At one point, early in his diary, he admonishes one of his students who had left 
Harvard College for a few days of fun in Ipswich, explicitly disobeying 
Wigglesworth's orders that he not go: 
I told him also of the dangers of pleasure and how they had like 
to have been my ruin. Knowing the danger of them therefore 
I dissuade both myself and others. And so I bade him farewell. 
But that very evening he was again at play I think among the 
students and when he saw me coming he slinked home and left 
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his game whereby I gather he is more afraid of me a poor, 
sinful worm than of God.17 
Although we might appreciate the severity of an absence without leave, 
Wigglesworth's outrage at finding his charge playing a game with fellow students 
later that day is unintentionally funny, although, as the editor of his diaries points 
out, Wigglesworth seems not to appreciate the ridiculousness of his own tirades, 
or his over-zealous response. 
In typical Puritan diaretic style, Wigglesworth does not limit his 
observations to the students in his charge, he also inveighs against others in his 
community, "Lord in mercy heal, or I know not what will become of New 
England. " At one point Wigglesworth launches into an extraordinarily obsessive 
meditation on his neighbor's door, which swings back and forth at night in the 
wind: 
I cannot tell whether it were it my duty to give them some hint 
that owe them. When I think 'tis a common thing, and that 'tis 
impossible but that the owners should have seen them in that 
case, and heard them blow to and fro, and that it is but a trivial 
matter, and that I have given a hint to one that dwells in the 
house, and he maketh light of it; and that it would rather be a 
seeming to check others mindlessness of their own affairs . . . 
and I am troubled.18 
He saves the great bulk of his observations, however, for himself, his vileness, 
his poor health, and most prominently, his sexuality. Indeed, Wigglesworth 
seems to be his own favorite subject. While he confesses again and again to the 
sins of pride and vanity, and reminds himself (and his readers?) endlessly of his 
worthlessness, such castigations only serve to underscore and heighten the 
suspicion that Wigglesworth was in fact extraordinarily self-centered, even, 
perhaps, vain and egomaniacal. His blindness to the double-bind is remarkable: 
he castigates himself for pride, but never suspects that his own self-obsessed self-
observation might be vain or prideful. Moreover, the hide and seek style of the 
diary, especially when describing his sexual proclivities (which seem decidedly 
homoerotic) and guilts, takes on a kind of voyeuristic theatricality beyond the 
conventional narcissism of the diary-as-self-observed. 
ah Lord I am vile, I desire to abhor my self (o that I could) 
before the for these things, [sic]. I find such unresistable 
torments of carnal lust or provocation unto the ejection of seed 
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that I find myself unable to read any thing to inform me about 
my distemper because of the prevailing or rising of my lusts.19 
The adolescent narcissism of the text is remarkable—it seems that Wigglesworth 
is unable to read and learn about his sexual problems because the words turn him 
on—and leads one to wonder in reading Wigglesworth's diary if there was in his 
mind an unseen audience, an other reader. This is an unknowable proposition, 
of course, but one that complicates the ontological cross-reflections. There are 
moments, for example, when the diarist seems so self-absorbed in his own 
physical and moral concerns, that he is oblivious even to his own conceit: when 
he asks his doctor if marriage is advisable for him, it is not because he is afraid 
of infecting his wife with the gonorrhea from which he suffers, but rather because 
he is afraid marriage might injure his health further. When the doctor advises 
him that marriage might offer physical comfort, the matter is more or less settled 
in Wigglesworth's mind. The idea that someone might someday read his words 
and be rightly appalled at such an egomaniacal afterthought seems far from his 
mind. Yet, at another point, when he discusses his disease more intimately, he 
becomes evasive—he describes the details of his affliction in Latin, "the excretio 
(which happened in the presence of such a friend) seminis."20 The tantalizing, 
even seductive timbre of the phrasing raises more questions than it answers: who 
might this friend be who witnesses the "excretio seminis," and under what 
circumstances might (he? she?) witness such an intimate occurrence. This is the 
reason, one might at first suppose, for the use of Latin, but while such phrasing 
might elude the prying eyes of his fiancé or other uneducated women or men, it 
would certainly not fool his audience of colleagues or students, who were required 
to converse in Latin while at Harvard College. Finally, when he gets to the point 
of actually naming the disease, he becomes almost coy, and calls it Gon:, 
suggesting in the word itself, gone/Gon, a kind of Freudian fort/da, a double 
desire for both concealment and revelation. 
What is interesting, in fact, about these evasions and sidesteps is that 
they seem not to be intentionally tactical; that is, the Latin and the abbreviations 
are easily deciphered, and seem designed to protect Wigglesworth from his own 
self-revelations. This contrasts with other places in the diary, where 
Wigglesworth actually writes in code, a kind of short-hand developed by Thomas 
Shelton and quite elaborate already, but complicated further by Wigglesworth, 
who added many of his own characters and abbreviations, rendering portions of 
the diary indecipherable.21 While it is true that such shorthand might simply be 
shorthand, i.e., a more efficient way of writing, one is impressed in the diary by 
the fact that most all of the shorthand sections deal with sexual matters, 
Wigglesworth's "filthy, carnal lusts." 
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One might also object that while Wigglesworth never intended his 
writings to be read, he feared they might. His refusal to write all of the seamy 
details in anything but the more elusive code indicates this. But then why use a 
accessible code like Shelton's that could be deciphered by an unknown reader? 
Why not use a private code that might more effectively prevent the private 
portions of his diary from being exposed? Perhaps because the issue was not 
merely to conceal the content of the writing. Indeed, even though portions remain 
occluded, the very idea of coded revelations suggest something else as well: that 
the desire might not be merely to conceal, nor merely to reveal—it might rather 
represent the desire to be seen concealing, to be seen concealed. The desire 
emerging out of this Sartrean voyeurism is the desire to be caught in the cross-
reflected strategies of theatre, revealing that one conceals, concealing the 
revelation, making sure the ruse is discovered, then covering up again, seducing 
the watcher in the shadows with the desire to be caught watching. It doesn't 
matter that Wigglesworth may not ever have imagined his diaries would one day 
be read by others, much less published; the ontologie desire of presentation and 
performance, finally of theatre, animates his writing. There is a suggestion in the 
diary, I believe, that facts and observations are being concealed from potentially 
prying eyes. But there is a further sense or sensibility in the writing that 
Wigglesworth himself is the watcher in the shadows. He is the one from whom 
certain desire and lusts must be hidden. The very theatrical ontology that is 
developed is repressed—the unconscious as mise en scene. 
But who, finally, in the cells of the repressed, might the watcher's object 
of desire have been? On the first page of his diary, in the first sentence, in fact, 
Wigglesworth first names the "unnatural, filthy lust," which arises in him as a 
result of a conversation with his pupils, all of whom are male, of course, and all 
of whom are "unloving . . . yet go so to my heart." His "fond affection," in 
fact, is often returned as ridicule and insult. He seems especially focused on one 
John Haines, the young man whom he castigates for being AWOL, and to whom 
he refers on several different occasions. Just what his feelings for this young man 
were, we may never know, but he appears upon the stage of Wigglesworth's 
meditations often, is privy to his intimate advice, and is even seemingly brought 
to tears by his abjurations. 
The full effect of Wigglesworth's writing is, as I have suggested, very 
nearly a recapitulation of the Puritan stereotype. He is both lust-driven, and yet 
seems quite openly to detest the flesh, and hovers dangerously close to 
Manicheaism in his suspicion that the physical world is evil. His rejection of 
sexuality, and his fervent desire to have God relieve him of the temptations of the 
flesh, his constant physical pains and sickly constitution, his attraction, finally, 
to a kind of Calvinized Gnosticism, in which the stern, vengeful God of Sinai 
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seems to threaten the obliteration of all flesh—suggest a man who, like Artaud, 
was possessed of a dramatic vision that was finally incapable of play. What is 
also noteworthy in Wigglesworth's diaries is his straight-ahead desire for 
constructedness, to be made as God would seemingly want him to be made, but 
finally to be rid of ego and desire along oddly egotistical, narcissistic lines, in 
which constructedness is perhaps the ego's way past the prototypical narcissistic 
stoppage. 
It is, in fact, a kind of narcissistic masochism which probably best 
describes Wigglesworth's diaries. Indeed, it is often noted within the 
psychoanalytic community that the diary is the expression par excellence of the 
narcissistic personality—recording all of the observed nuances and occurrences of 
the day in order to keep the self that is constantly in danger of fading into the 
image of the self-as-other, stable and self-possessed. 
Consequently, in a kind of extension of something like the Lacanian 
mirror-stage, Wiggles worth is so preoccupied with his own self-image that he 
becomes entirely captivated by it. In his captivation, moreover, he projects that 
image onto the world around him, seeing in others the same masochistic abjection 
that fuels his ego. Ultimately he projects that image onto a potential love object, 
John Haines, so that he may suffer the inevitable humiliation of ridicule, "meeting 
with some very disrespectful carriage," thus activating both a Freudian moral 
masochism as well as an erotogenic masochism that seems, as I have already 
suggested, plainly homoerotic. In either case, Wigglesworth's captivation by his 
own image within the frame of a nearly infinite extension of the mirror-stage 
suggests also his captivation by a theatre that he never sees, but that sees him. 
We see in Wiggles worth the same Artaudian drive toward the divine, a divine that 
seems at every turn to reject and elude him—a drive that seems in its pursuit of 
perfection, doomed to failure at the outset. There is in either case a desire to find 
the self as saved and purified, a desire that is aborted at each turn when the 
watcher watching the self watching finds only a sham identity, falsified papers. 
5. 
In the introduction to Thomas Shepard's collection of writings, God's 
Plot, the editor explains why he has used the phrase from Shepard's 
autobiography as the title of his work: 
Shepard and his people envisioned a divine scenario governing 
the living of their lives and the saving of their souls. They 
became actors with parts to play in a cosmic drama of 
redemption. God wrote the script, cast the parts, directed the 
Spring 1998 29 
staging; Christ took the starring role; religion explained each 
act and scene.22 
The phrase "God's Plot" is indeed the phrase Shepard uses for the divine plan, but 
his writing reveals a theatrical ontology that moves well beyond such easy 
metaphors, into the seeing, and the doubled seeing, that characterizes much of 
Western theatre. On March 18, 1641, for example, Thomas Shepard writes in 
his diary: 
I saw if my mind acted it spun nothing but deceit and delusion; 
if my will and affections acted, nothing but dead works. Oh, 
how do I need Christ to live in me! Yet I saw if a man hath 
eyes and life he will not lean on another to lead him and carry 
him as when he wants both; so here. I saw the Lord made me 
live by faith by making me feel a want of both, to distrust 
myself and trust more unto the Lord.23 
The incantatory use of the prophetic and quintessentially theatrical "I saw," (and 
even more compelling "I saw if a man hath eyes") in this passage is typical of 
Shepard's style, and occurs throughout his diaries. But this "I saw" expresses 
more than mere stylistic mannerism. The intense self-observation throughout his 
diaries is the raison d'etre of the genre itself—by carefully recording the 
movements of mind, belief and action, the Puritan writers hoped to objectify and 
thus control the vagaries of desire and sin. They are ostensibly private forms of 
expression (unlike the sermons and sacred poetry, for example) but this very 
privacy underscores the performative qualities of the self's struggle to understand 
and thus re-construct itself, because the process of self-observation requires, or 
rather ratifies, the deep split within the self that allows for an observing self to 
monitor a self observed, and finally to observe the observing itself. The diarist, 
in other words, in watching his own watchfulness, activates and also represses 
that quality of consciousness, qua consciousness, that I have called the theatrical. 
Moreover, the process of observation that occurs in these diaries is not merely the 
idle action of mind that we so casually call "theatrical." Rather, this is a 
discipline that requires the individual to marshall a whole panoply of observational 
techniques. Sight lines must be opened. Emotional recall must be sharpened. 
Memory of part and dialogue must be recollected. In short, the Puritan technique 
of self-observation demands the realization of the field of illusion as illusion itself, 
the mise en scene. 
What is arresting about the entry quoted above, for example, moves well 
beyond the discovery of the "primal wound" that is consciousness/theatre. The 
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observation enters quickly and quite unwittingly into the serpentine ontology that 
theatre itself inhabits: for the very mind/self that observes is itself defined by its 
own "deceit and delusion." Consciousness, and that high consciousness that is 
theatre, observes deceit and delusion as its own substance. But how can that 
observation be believed, made as it is, by the deluded mind? 
More than the mere riddling quality of such a statement however, is the 
deep ontological anxiety over appearances that runs throughout much Puritan 
theology and metaphysics, an anxiety well noted by those writing about Puritan 
culture. For the acute observations of Shepard the diarist are undercut by the 
realization that salvation can only be had by those who cannot observe, those who 
"want eyes and life" ; salvation can only be had, in other words, by those capable 
of seeing the necessity of blindness, because those who want eyes and life are 
thrust into faith by their own distrust of themselves and their ability, thus 
inability, to see. And there is no reliance on "the wisdom of the body" 
either—both will and affection are as much to be distrusted as the mind. 
This convolution of mind and desire, of consciousness and blindness, 
erupts in another passage by Shepard: 
I saw that I was worthy to be left to myself and in my misery 
and sin, (1) not only because I had sinned, but (2) because of 
my very desires to come out of it.24 
Abandonment by God is deserved, Shepard seems to be saying, not only because 
I have sinned, but because I have desired to stop sinning, and thus come out of 
abandonment. This is the psychic conundrum of an emergent solipsistic 
tautology, similar in some respects to the convolutions one reads about in the 
practice of Zen meditation—as long as meditation is directed at "liberation" it is 
not true meditation; as long as the seeker seeks something through sitting, s/he is 
still lost. And yet obviously the reason one sits is because one wishes not to be 
lost, but wishing not to be lost renders it impossible to be any other way, and so 
on. 
There is a similar conundrum in the Puritan attitude toward history. In 
Calvinist Christianity, and most pointedly in Puritanism, who we were in the past, 
and who we are now is, in the doctrine of predestination, moot—even though our 
fate has been cast in some divine past, that past is concealed from us. What 
matters is the future—either eternal life or eternal torment. But that future 
depends on the past that is hidden from us. Past is thus recast as future. Robert 
K. Merton, in his controversial essay, "Motive Forces of the New Science," sees 
this recasting of past as future leading to the Puritans "fervent belief in progress, " 
which induces them eventually to embrace science and empiricism as proper 
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modes of thought. One can see in Shepard's diaries the intense mood of 
self/doubt intrinsic to much Puritan writing, an attitude of observational 
skepticism that could very well bolster an emergent empiricist search for "true 
causes. " Indeed, out of the work of Merton and Sacvan Bercovitch one might see 
the insistence on materiality in theory and historicism as more properly 
Puritanical than more phenomenal or ontological approaches to performance 
theory. 
The salient difference, however, between Calvinism and other modes of 
spirituality is that in the Puritan mind the moral battle of blindness and insight 
plays itself out through a "self" that is seen as the origin, and not the product, of 
the wounded consciousness that observes it. The self appears to the Puritan 
writers as a lack, as something which is at the moment of its appearance depraved 
and stunted. But in observing and trying to correct and recorrect the self, the 
diarists end up obsessed with the self, and so construct and reconstruct it again 
and again. The self, in other words, is for the Puritans real, but depraved, and 
so causes delusion and is not caused or generated by it, as is the case in 
Buddhism, for example. This confusion between cause and effect, or rather the 
confusion between causes and reasons, explains in part the confusion in Shepard's 
work between the necessity and desire for blindness, and the fact that it is sin that 
is the cause of blindness. Salvation necessitates sin, to be sure, as sin necessitates 
salvation. What is fascinating is the sense that at some level of the Puritan mind, 
sin and salvation are the same: 
I saw that sin did blind, and God also for sin, three ways: 
(1) Sin blinds by driving God, the God of all wisdom, from the 
soul, and so there is nothing but darkness; a man sees no 
spiritual things. 
(2) It spoils the understanding of all light also inherent in it that 
when the Lord opens the truth against it, cannot see it. 
(3) The soul when it endeavors to conceive of spiritual things, 
it grows more blind . . .25 
The passage is fairly straightforward until we recall that the author makes this 
observation having earlier sought blindness from God so that he might find faith. 
The "I saw" trope in Shepard is recapitulated again and again by the repetitive use 
of a thematics of blindness. The more intensely the self observes, the more it is 
led into blindness, the more the self seeks truth, the more it sees only delusion, 
until finally it sees seeing itself as merest delusion, but delusion well observed. 
This observation of delusion also opens out into Shepard's ministerial 
work. In the confessions, we see an activation of a form of piety that comes 
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tantalizingly close to theatre itself. In the confessional displays, would-be 
members of the congregation had to stand before those already accepted, and tell 
of their sin and salvation. The speeches were carefully written and rehearsed 
again and again in order to straddle the fine dramatic line between humble 
admission of sinfulness, and glorification of God's power in one's life. If one 
erred in one's presentation, and suggested, for example, that salvation came 
because one accepted God, or some such formula, it could easily seem as if one 
were taking credit for one's salvation. Thus the confessions were anxious affairs, 
and sometimes provoked the audience to angry questioning of the confessées' 
sincerity and intent—in the language of Method acting, the confessée would be 
accused of "indicating" instead of experiencing. While the scenes unfolded, 
moreover, Shepard would sit to the side, quill in hand, and carefully record the 
script, stage directions and all, as it played itself out. But such displays and 
performances fall well short of anything like a morality or miracle play. Personal 
identity is still firmly, if problematically, attached to each subject, and the stories, 
even if carefully constructed, are still perceived to be true. The idea that 
American Puritan culture could take the step into theatre, even sacred theatre, 
remains unthinkable. 
And it is small wonder that the Puritans could not make the break, 
finally, into theatre, a theatre which would supply them with the paradigm by 
which they might find salvation from salvation, so to speak. For like Artaud, 
they could not carry the alienated self to its acting conclusion. They were caught 
in the ontology of authenticity/falseness, and were not able to find release in the 
rejection of the authentic, and the tentative embrace of the mask. They were 
condemned to the lucid blindess of a theatricalized life devoid of theatre, an 
inversion of Artaud's pain: the blind lucidity of a theatre devoid of life. 
At the level of the simply theatrical, it is not hard to imagine the Puritan 
penchant for observation mutating in later ages into an obsession for the 
spectacle—if seeing, even seeing blindness, is the means to finding truth, what 
better truths than spectacles—circuses, wild west shows, tent revivals, freak 
shows, Mardi Gras—whose entire truth lies purely in the seemingly seen? And 
what better protection from recognizing the emptiness of spectacle than a belief 
in an authentic behind it, an authentic constructed through the illusions of 
spectacle? What final way to solidify such a belief than through an enduring 
belief in the material, in the seen, as the means to truth? In response to the 
materialist captivation of current theory, Peggy Phelan, writing of the substance 
of the unseen and unseeable in cultural performance, writes a plea that might have 
flowed from the pen of Shepard himself, a prayer both moving and unnerving in 
its challenge to, and recapitulation of Puritan thought: 
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At the limit of the physical body, at the limit of the blind eye, 
at the limit of the signifier, one sees both the knowledge of 
failure and the performance of belief propped up on all sides by 
serious and comic doubt. Certain of failure, I inscribe, again, 
my hope for blind (and forgiving) eyes.27 
The recent dominance of the performative over theatre, the tendency to relegate 
theatre to but one form of performance and in doing so to erase the insubstantial 
substance of theatre, is also to resuscitate the Puritan solipsism. In trying to find 
forms of performance that seemingly elude theatre, we delude and finally lose 
sight of ourselves. 
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